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The Standing of Article III Standing
for Data Breach Litigants: Proposing
a Judicial and a Legislative Solution
Data breaches are not going away. Yet victims still face uncertainty
when deciding whether and where to file cases against companies or other
institutions that may have mishandled their information. This is especially true
if the victims have not yet experienced a financial harm, like identity theft, as a
result of a data breach. Much of the uncertainty revolves around the standing
doctrine and the Supreme Court’s guidance (or lack thereof) on what constitutes
a substantial risk of harm sufficient to establish an injury in fact. Federal
circuit courts have come to divergent results in data breach cases based on the
Supreme Court’s guidance. This Note analyzes these divergent results and
shows that the circuits are not as far apart as some commentators
have suggested.
This Note then proposes two possible clarifying measures—one judicial
and one legislative. The judicial solution is a test the Supreme Court should
adopt for evaluating standing in data breach litigation. The test would have
courts assess three factors and would allow plaintiffs who have not yet had their
data misused to establish standing. Under the test, courts would examine (1)
whether the breach was targeted; (2) whether the thief attained information that
could lead to financial harm; and (3) whether any portion of the compromised
data has been misused. For the legislative solution, this Note proposes language
for a private right of action that could be inserted into federal legislation, either
as part of comprehensive privacy legislation or in sector-specific
privacy legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
A customer buys some food for the week at the grocery store and
uses a credit card for the purchase.1 Two months later, the grocery store
informs her that a software intrusion has led to the unauthorized
disclosure of her name, credit card number, expiration date, card
verification value (“CVV”), and personal identification number (“PIN”).2
She is not alone, and she teams up with fifteen other plaintiffs to sue
the company for negligence.3 Does she have standing to sue if no one
has yet misused her data? The answer partially depends on where
she sues.
Certain United States Courts of Appeals have held that
plaintiffs lack standing4 if they cannot demonstrate a thief or hacker
has misused the compromised data. 5 Others have disagreed, holding
that a data breach can create a substantial risk of harm sufficient to
confer standing.6 This Note posits that the circuits’ underlying
reasoning is not as inconsistent as the results in the cases would

1.
This scenario is borrowed from In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017). The facts have been slightly modified in this first sentence.
2.
Id. at 766.
3.
Id.
4.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that under the “Cases” and “Controversies”
limitation in Article III, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have standing in order for federal
courts to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claims. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Simon v.
E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37–38 (1976) (noting the constitutional roots of standing).
A plaintiff must demonstrate three things to show that they have standing: injury in fact,
causation, and redressability. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011) (“The party invoking
the Court's authority has [standing] when three conditions are satisfied: The petitioner must show
that he has ‘suffered an injury in fact’ that is caused by ‘the conduct complained of’ and that ‘will
be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992))). This standing doctrine ensures that plaintiffs have a “personal stake” in the suit.
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). More
detail on the jurisprudential roots of standing is in Section I.A.
5.
See infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text (collecting cases).
6.
See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text (collecting cases).
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suggest. Rather, differences in the facts between the cases explain some
of the varying results.
For instance, one circuit court held that a plaintiff lacked
standing when the plaintiff could not demonstrate misuse after
someone stole a laptop containing the plaintiff’s medical information.7
Conversely, another circuit held that plaintiffs did have standing after
pleading that their credit card information was stolen when hackers
breached the servers of an online shoe retailer.8 These cases seemingly
reside on opposite sides of a “split” based on their results, but the
underlying reasoning of each court focuses on similar factors. These
factors help courts assess whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a
“substantial risk” of injury sufficient to create an injury in fact,9 and the
limited “splits” in the circuits are a result of the varied applications of
those individual factors.10
In addition to a plaintiff’s facts, which are important for the
standing analysis, the type of claim also partially explains the divide in
the circuits’ results. If a claim is based on a private right of action in a
statute, plaintiffs who may otherwise have insufficient evidence to
create an injury in fact can rely on Congress’s definition of what
constitutes an injury. As these fault lines in the circuit results show,
data breach litigation is complicated. But extracting the differences in
facts and claims in the circuit precedent can help ensure that plaintiffs
and litigants craft the best possible case to garner standing.
Data breaches are on the rise,11 meaning class action data
breach litigation is likely to remain a mainstay on federal court dockets.
Both institutions and individuals face challenges in responding to these
breaches. On one side, after experiencing a breach, companies and other
breached entities have to comply with myriad state data breach laws
that may sometimes contradict one another.12 On the other side, even if
7.
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 266–67 (4th Cir. 2017).
8.
In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.
2018), cert. denied sub nom. Zappos.com, Inc. v. Stevens, 139 S. Ct. 1373 (2019) (mem.).
9.
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 n.5 (2013) (describing factors that
create a substantial risk of injury sufficient to create an injury in fact, such as plaintiffs having “to
reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid [a] harm”).
10. See infra Section II.A (explaining how various circuits have applied the factors).
11. See James Coker, 278% Rise in Leaked Government Records During Q1 of 2020,
INFOSECURITY
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/rise-leakedgovernment-records/ [https://perma.cc/4836-NLZ7] (noting that in the first quarter of 2020, 278%
more government records were released than in the first quarter of 2019); James Sanders, Data
Breaches Increased 54% in 2019 So Far, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 15, 2019, 7:35 AM),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/data-breaches-increased-54-in-2019-so-far/
[https://perma.cc/QNL5-XNVZ] (reporting that 2019 has seen a greater than fifty percent increase
in breaches compared to the previous four years).
12. Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission: Strengthening Protections for Americans’
Privacy and Data Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Commerce of the
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individuals whose personal information has been compromised do not
experience identity theft immediately, they face the prospect of
increased risk of identity theft and spending time and money on credit
monitoring or other preventative measures, as well as potential anxiety
or emotional stress as they wait for potential misuse.13 Though these
realities may seem like they harm the lives of the data breach victims,
courts have often found that they do not satisfy the “injury in fact”
requirement of Article III standing because they are “too speculative.”14
This Note breaks down the circuit split on standing in data
breach cases and suggests the factual complexity of data breach cases
is obscuring a test for post-breach standing—a test that is already
developing in the circuits. Part I provides the relevant background on
standing and private rights of action in federal consumer privacy
statutes. Section II.A then examines the circuit court split over whether
the mere fact of a data breach creates a “substantial risk” of injury.
Section II.A particularly focuses on three factors that form a common
thread through many of the cases involved in the split: the
intentionality of the breach; the nature of the breached information;
and the misuse of part, but not all, of a compromised data set. Section
III.A proposes that the Supreme Court employ a test comprised of these
three factors when determining whether data breach victims have
standing. Such a test would provide clarity to the circuits and resolve
the circuit divisions over whether a breach leads to a “substantial risk”
of injury. Without more guidance from the Supreme Court on what
constitutes a “substantial risk,” however, the proposed test may still
leave many data breach victims unable to demonstrate injury in fact
sufficient for standing. In order to address those left behind by the test,
this Note proposes a second, legislative solution: a federal private right
of action.
H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (statement of Christine S. Wilson,
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (“The passage of the California Consumer Privacy Act and the
prospect of bills in at least a dozen states have created confusion and uncertainty in the business
community. This confusion is particularly acute because provisions in various state bills may
contradict each other.”).
13. See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 750–54 (2018) (laying out the increased-risk-of harm, costs associated
with preventing harm, and anxiety as the three main injuries cited by those that have not
experienced identity theft).
14. Beck is perhaps the leading example, but lower courts have also found the injury to be too
speculative. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2017); see, e.g., Khan v. Children’s
Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 532 (D. Md. 2016) (holding that plaintiffs need to put forth
facts that provide either actual examples of attempted use of the personal information or “a clear
indication” that the hackers wanted the information to use in identity fraud in order to properly
allege an injury in fact arising from an increased risk of identity theft); Strautins v. Trustwave
Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that a class did not have standing
when it commenced the suit three weeks after a breach).
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Section II.B analyzes the Supreme Court’s standing
jurisprudence as it applies to private rights of action in data privacy
cases, and Section III.B proposes simple language for lawmakers
wanting to ensure that data breach victims get their day in court. The
legislative solution in Section III.B would create an injury in fact for all
data breach plaintiffs, dispelling the need for the test in Section III.A.
The Supreme Court has declined to address whether stolen data creates
a substantial risk of injury,15 leaving uncertainty among the circuits.
To remedy that uncertainty, Section III.B suggests a cure-all, blanket
solution that Congress could adopt in the face of judicial inaction.
I. BACKGROUND
The judicial and legislative branches each have roles to play in
clarifying whether the risk of identity theft after a data breach is a
sufficient risk to confer standing. This Part first addresses how the
judicial branch has created uncertainty, laying out the relevant
doctrinal groundwork of Article III standing and demonstrating that
the Supreme Court has left the circuits with relatively little guidance
on what constitutes an injury in fact.
In the last decade, the United States Supreme Court issued two
landmark decisions relevant to the Article III standing analysis:
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA16 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
(Spokeo I).17 In combination, these decisions have created confusion in
the federal circuits, leading to a division over what type of harm is
“concrete” and “imminent” enough to rise to the level of an injury in
fact. In data breach litigation specifically, circuits have come to
different results on whether data breach victims have standing even if
they cannot demonstrate misuse of their compromised data.18
15. CareFirst, Inc. v. Attias, 138 S. Ct. 981, 981 (2018) (mem.) (denying certiorari on
“[w]hether a plaintiff has Article III standing based on a substantial risk of harm that is not
imminent and where the alleged future harm requires speculation about the choices of third-party
actors not before the court.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, CareFirst, 138 S. Ct. 981 (No. 17641) (2017)).
16. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
17. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
18. Compare Beck, 848 F.3d at 266 (holding that the risk of future identity theft was
“speculative” where plaintiffs did not plead that the thieves intended to steal the breached data),
and In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 768–70 (8th Cir. 2017)
(holding that it was not concrete enough to plead that generally, forty percent of those whose credit
card numbers are compromised experience fraud the following year), with Attias v. CareFirst, Inc.,
865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding that standing existed and explaining that “a substantial
risk of harm exists already, simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the
plaintiffs allege was taken”), and Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th
Cir. 2016) (“Where a data breach targets personal information, a reasonable inference can be
drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data for the fraudulent purposes alleged in Plaintiffs’
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Subsection I.A traces the roots of the injury-in-fact confusion, focusing
particularly on the implications for data breach litigants.
On the legislative side, as is the dominant trend in many areas
of privacy law,19 Congress has not passed a statute devoted to
addressing all data breaches—much less one with a private right of
action.20 Some privacy advocates and legal scholars have suggested that
a federal private right of action for data breach victims may resolve the
standing split among the circuits.21 Subsection I.B explains how
legislatively created private rights of action function, specifically with
regard to a number of privacy statutes. Those private rights of action
provide narrow avenues of relief for certain plaintiffs that may not have
otherwise been able to demonstrate an injury in fact.
A. The Development of Article III
Standing and Data Breach Litigation
Article III standing ensures that federal courts pass judgment
only on “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies”22 and that “a specific person is
the proper party to bring a matter to the court.”23 In the mid-twentieth
century, that standard meant individuals with a private, but not public,
right could seek recourse in the courts.24 The doctrine developed into
three elements that a plaintiff must prove in order to allow the court to
hear her case: (1) an injury in fact that demonstrates an “invasion of a
legally protected interest”; (2) a causal nexus between the injury and

complaints.”); see also Brandon Ferrick, Comment, No Harm, No Foul: The Fourth Circuit
Struggles with the “Injury-in-Fact” Requirement to Article III Standing in Data Breach Class
Actions, 59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 462 (2018) (explaining the circuit split and advocating for the
Fourth Circuit’s approach, which rejects the risk of identity theft as an injury-in-fact sufficient to
confer standing).
19. See Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1441, 1464 (2017) (noting the federal government has lagged in responding to
privacy problems).
20. See Justin H. Dion & Nicholas M. Smith, Consumer Protection—Exploring Private Causes
of Action for Victims of Data Breaches, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 253, 267–72 (2019) (summarizing
the federal data protection laws).
21. See, e.g., id. (advocating for an amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act to
permit individuals to sue to enforce data breach response violations); Michael Hopkins, Comment,
Your Personal Information Was Stolen: That’s an Injury: Article III Standing in the Context of Data
Breaches, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 427 (2019) (proposing language for a private right of action based on
California’s data breach notification law as it stood in 2015).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 55 (7th ed. 2016).
24. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 464 (1939) (“No matter how seriously infringement
of the Constitution may be called into question, this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by
those who have some specialized interest of their own to vindicate, apart from a political concern
which belongs to all.”).
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the defendant’s conduct; and (3) redressability of the injury.25 Since the
late twentieth century, the Court has required a more established
injury in fact, mandating a plaintiff show an injury that is “concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent.”26
At the same time, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
standing is not a particularly onerous requirement: plaintiffs can
satisfy standing with “general factual allegations of injury resulting
from the defendant’s conduct.”27 But while the requirement may not be
designed to be onerous, the Court’s decisions in Clapper and Spokeo
combine to create a morass for circuits trying to determine whether
plaintiffs have standing in data breach litigation.
In Clapper, the Court held that future injuries suffice to create
standing as long as they are “certainly impending.” At the same time,
the Court also noted that a “substantial risk” of harm has been
sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact element of standing in the past.28
In the case, public interest groups and various individuals brought suit
against the U.S. government, challenging a national security law—the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008—and alleging that the law would allow
the government to surveil communications with individuals outside the
United States.29 The plaintiffs argued they had standing because the
government was likely to surveil their communications and because
they had to take precautions to keep the government from intercepting
the communications.30 After noting that an “especially rigorous” review
of standing was required because of the national security and
separation of powers implications of the case,31 the Court laid out the
two tests for determining whether future injuries qualify as injuries in
fact: the “certainly impending” test and the “substantial risk” test. 32
Applying the stricter and more rigorous “certainly impending”
test—possibly because of the national security implications—the Court
25. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
26. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
27. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see also Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979) (“In order to satisfy [U.S. Const.] Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of
the defendant.”).
28. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, 414 n.5.
29. Id. at 406.
30. Id. at 407.
31. Id. at 408–09.
32. See id. at 409, 414 n.5:
Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain
that the harms they identify will come about. In some instances, we have found
standing based on a “substantial risk” that the harm will occur, which may prompt
plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.
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held that the likelihood of the government surveilling plaintiffs’
communications was based on “mere conjecture about possible
governmental actions.”33 The Court stood by its “usual reluctance to
endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions
of independent actors.”34 Next, the Court held that for standing
purposes, costs accrued in response to a future harm constitute an
injury only if the underlying future harm is “certainly impending” or
imminent.35 Despite the outcome in Clapper, the “substantial risk” test
did not go away: a year after the Clapper decision, the Court repeated
that a future injury is an injury in fact if there is “a ‘substantial risk’
that the harm will occur.”36 Given the lack of separation of powers or
national securities issues involved in data breach cases, the
“substantial risk” test has become the standard that circuits—on both
sides of the divergent results—use for data breach litigants.37
The Court’s decision in Spokeo, issued two years after Clapper,
sheds light on another possible avenue to establish a sufficiently
concrete injury in fact: a congressionally created interest. In Spokeo, the
plaintiff sued Spokeo under a private right of action provided in the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) for “willfully fail[ing]” to “follow
reasonable procedures” in maintaining the accuracy of information that
would affect his creditworthiness.38 The Court held that—without
more—a “bare procedural violation” like distributing an incorrect zip
code for an individual is not sufficiently concrete to confer standing
based on an injury under the FCRA.39 The Court remanded the case to
the Ninth Circuit, requiring a more in-depth concreteness analysis.40
33. Id. at 420.
34. Id. at 414.
35. See id. at 416:
Respondents’ contention that they have standing because they incurred certain costs as
a reasonable reaction to a risk of harm is unavailing—because the harm respondents
seek to avoid is not certainly impending. . . . [R]espondents cannot manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical
future harm that is not certainly impending.
36. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting Clapper, 568
U.S. at 414 n.5) (addressing whether the threat of future law enforcement could confer standing).
The Driehaus Court did not elaborate on the substantial risk test beyond asserting that it was a
possible avenue for establishing injury in fact. Id.; see also Nicholas Green, Standing in the Future:
The Case for a Substantial Risk Theory of “Injury in Fact” in Consumer Data Breach Class Actions,
58 B.C. L. REV. 287, 304–05 (2017) (arguing that a Supreme Court majority would likely support
a “substantial risk” test in data breach litigation).
37. See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1024,
1029 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding standing based on a “substantial risk” of future harm after a breach);
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (denying standing based on a lack of
“substantial risk”).
38. Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016).
39. Id. at 1550.
40. Id.
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit held that the FCRA does establish a
sufficiently concrete interest, offering hope to litigants trying to
establish standing based on intangible harms.41
While some consumer protection statutes, like the FCRA, allow
data breach litigants to establish standing through a congressionally
created private right of action,42 the patchwork of federal consumer
protection statutes leaves many data breach litigants to rely on possible
future identity theft to establish standing.43 As a result, evaluating
standing in data breach litigation has turned into a highly fact-sensitive
inquiry that closely mirrors the substantive evaluation of
the
underlying
claims,
especially
when
examining
the
injury-in-fact requirement.44
Plaintiffs who have not yet experienced identity theft resulting
from a breach typically argue one of three injuries: risk of identity theft
(a future injury), time and money spent on credit monitoring or other
preventative measures (a present injury), or anxiety or emotional stress
(a present injury).45 In the absence of a private right of action and a
statutorily created interest, plaintiffs have to argue that identity theft
is a concrete injury and that the risk is sufficiently imminent to make
it a “substantial risk” under Clapper.46 When assessing the imminence
of a future identity theft based on the Supreme Court’s limited guidance
in Clapper, courts have implicitly looked at the following factors to
determine whether the threat rises to the level of a substantial risk: (1)
the presence of intent to specifically take the breached data,47 (2) the
41. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo II), 867 F.3d 1108, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2017).
42. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 640–41 (3d
Cir. 2017) (finding standing based on a statutory interest underlying the FCRA).
43. See infra Section II.B (discussing federal consumer protection statutes with a private
right of action).
44. See Solove & Citron, supra note 13, at 748 (arguing that the harm analysis is often
determinative for data breach cases and often leads to early dismissal).
45. See id. at 750–54 (laying out the increased-risk-of harm, costs associated with preventing
harm, and anxiety as the three main injuries cited by those that have not experienced
identity theft).
46. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013); see, e.g., Attias v.
CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017):
“[T]he proper way to analyze an increased-risk-of-harm claim is to consider the ultimate
alleged harm,” which in this case would be identity theft, “as the concrete and
particularized injury and then to determine whether the increased risk of such harm
makes injury to an individual citizen sufficiently ‘imminent’ for standing purposes.” . . .
Nobody doubts that identity theft, should it befall one of these plaintiffs, would
constitute a concrete and particularized injury.
(quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
47. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 628–29 (applying the substantial risk test and holding that it is
not speculative to infer that a hacker has the “intent and the ability” to use the accessed personal
information); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Why else
would hackers break into a . . . database and steal consumers’ private information? Presumably,
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type of data released,48 and (3) the misuse of any of the data accessed
during a breach.49
Unfortunately, the courts have relied on these factors without
stating as much, leading numerous plaintiffs to inadequately plead
injury.50 Furthermore, application of these factors—particularly the
first factor—leaves courts attempting to assess the intent of a
nonparty.51 Perhaps predictably, assessing intent has also contributed
to the divergent results: some circuits view the theft of consumer data
as sufficient to create an inference of intentionality, while others look
for more.52 These divergent results present confusion post-Clapper and
post-Spokeo. Part II will further analyze the divergent results and
highlight the splits within the factors. Notably, unlike the plaintiff in
Spokeo, the plaintiffs mired in the divergent results are only stuck
because they are unable to establish another concrete interest besides
the threat of future injury; they cannot point to a statutory interest that
has been violated and can be vindicated through a private right
of action.53

the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those
consumers’ identities.”).
48. Compare Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017) (“And
[plaintiff] does not allege how she can plausibly face a threat of future fraud, because her stolen
credit card was promptly canceled after the breach and no other personally identifying
information—such as her birth date or Social Security number—is alleged to have been stolen.”),
with Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2016) (conferring
standing when a breached databased contained personal information such as “names, dates of
birth, marital statuses, genders, occupations, employers, Social Security numbers, and driver’s
license numbers”).
49. See, e.g., In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 56 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (finding that there was a substantial risk of harm from future identity theft because
part of the class had already “experienced various types of identity theft, including the
unauthorized opening of new credit card and other financial accounts and the filing of fraudulent
tax returns in their names”).
50. See, e.g., Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90–91 (holding that the plaintiff failed to plead that she
spent any time or money monitoring her credit even when she pled that the thief had tried to use
her card after she changed the number).
51. Assessing the intent of a third party was a large issue in Clapper, and assessing the intent
of the thief is the main problem with the analysis for courts that hold that a breach alone is enough
to confer standing. See 568 U.S. at 413–14.
52. Compare In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 767, 774
(8th Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing after alleging that their credit card
information was stolen in a software intrusion because there was no evidence that the stolen
information had been used), with Attias, 865 F.3d at 630 (conferring standing after the hack of a
health-care company).
53. See Spokeo II, 867 F.3d 1108, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the need for plaintiffs
to show a “real” injury and relying on congressional judgment as to what qualifies as a “real”
intangible injury when deciding whether to confer standing).
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B. Private Rights of Action and Standing
Scholars and advocates have suggested a number of solutions to
resolving the circuit split over whether to confer standing based on
increased risk of identity theft. Some scholars have advocated for
reconceptualizing how courts think about probabilistic injuries,
including acknowledging risk and anxiety as harms in data breach
cases, as courts have done in other contexts.54 Other commentators
have argued for the Supreme Court to recognize a right to privacy for
personal data.55 Beyond ameliorating the Article III standing issues,
inserting into federal legislation a private right of action that recognizes
an individual’s right to sue for actual damages ensuing from a breach—
an approach many states have taken—is popular among privacy
advocates.56 But, for standing in particular, legal commentators have
suggested a private right of action may create an imminent and
concrete interest that confers standing.57
The most recent guidance from the Court on when injuries are
sufficiently “concrete” came in Spokeo, which concerned an alleged
violation of the FCRA.58 The FCRA contains a private right of action:
“[A]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the
Act] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer” for “actual
damages” or statutory damages, as well as attorney’s costs and fees.59
The plaintiff asserted his private right to sue by arguing that Spokeo,
as a consumer reporting agency, had willfully failed to follow certain
statutory requirements.60 When reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s standing
54. See Solove & Citron, supra note 13, at 756–73 (pointing to increased recognition of
injuries based on future probabilistic injuries, including risk of future injury in medical
malpractice cases, and to growing acceptance of anxiety and emotional distress as a harm); see also
Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283 (2013) (proposing the
use of expected value in assessing injury in fact).
55. See Nick Beatty, Note, Standing Room Only: Solving the Injury-in-Fact Problem for Data
Breach Plaintiffs, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1289, 1290–91 (2016) (analyzing Clapper and Spokeo and
suggesting that recognizing a right to privacy would suffice to create a concrete injury).
56. See, e.g., Ams. for Fin. Reform et al., The Time Is Now: A Framework for Comprehensive
Privacy Protection and Digital Rights in the United States, CONSUMER FED’N AM. 2 (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/4.19Privacy-and-Digital-Rights-For-AllFramework.pdf [https://perma.cc/J93T-X7ZQ] (advocating for a private right of action as an
integral part of enforcing privacy rights).
57. See, e.g., Patricia Cave, Comment, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand On: Finding
Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts in Data Security Breach Suits,
62 CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 769 (2013) (arguing for a private right of action in federal legislation);
Elizabeth T. Isaacs, Comment, Exposure Without Redress: A Proposed Remedial Tool for the
Victims Who Were Set Aside, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 519, 554–56 (2015) (suggesting that a private right
of action would remove standing as a barrier to recovery for data breach victims).
58. Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2012).
60. Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at 1545.
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analysis, the Supreme Court held the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was
incomplete because it did not properly assess whether the plaintiff’s
injury was concrete—that is, whether it “actually exist[ed].”61
Remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit, the Court made clear that
certain intangible injuries may be concrete.62 Importantly, the violation
of a statute with a private right of action is an intangible injury that
can confer Article III standing as long as it is not a “bare procedural
violation.”63 The Court identified two factors that contribute to whether
a statutory violation is not “a bare procedural violation” and rises to the
level of a “concrete” injury: (1) “[W]hether an alleged intangible harm
has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts,” and
(2) Congress’s “judgment . . . . Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of
legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were
previously inadequate in law.’ ”64
On remand, the Ninth Circuit applied the Court’s new
concreteness analysis.65 The court held that the concrete injury
Congress intended to protect through the relevant provision of the
FCRA was the transmission of inaccurate information that would affect
an individual’s credit report and that the plaintiff could sue to enforce
that provision. The Ninth Circuit created a new standing test for
plaintiffs seeking to vindicate purported statutory rights: Were the
statutory provisions at issue “established to protect . . . concrete
interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights)[?]” And if so, do “the
specific procedural violations alleged in this case actually harm, or
present a material risk of harm to, such interests[?]”66 The formulations
of the Supreme Court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s tests would prove
instructive for litigants seeking to establish a concrete statutory
interest sufficient to confer standing.67
The Ninth Circuit’s new test relies on the language of a specific
statute, and a number of federal statutes implicating privacy rights
already contain private rights of action. The Fair and Accurate Credit
61. Id. at 1548.
62. Id. at 1549.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). In data breach litigation
and data privacy litigation more generally, both of these factors play a role in assessing whether
a statute has created a sufficiently concrete injury to rise to the level of “legally cognizable.” See
infra Section III.B (discussing how some courts have found standing based on statutory interests’
similarities to common law torts).
65. Spokeo II, 867 F.3d 1108, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2017).
66. Id. at 1113.
67. See infra Section III.B (discussing how plaintiffs have tried to use private rights of action
to establish standing).
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Transactions Act (“FACTA”) amended the FCRA in 2003 to better
protect individuals from identity theft and to allow individuals to sue to
enforce certain provisions.68 Like the FCRA, the Cable Communications
Policy Act (“CCPA”), which requires cable operators to “destroy
personally identifiable information if the information is no longer
necessary for the purpose for which it was collected,” also allows
individuals to sue for enforcement.69 However, despite numerous efforts
at the federal level,70 Congress has failed to enact a statute that covers
all data breaches, not just those concerning consumer reporting
agencies or cable operators. Furthermore, following Spokeo, some
federal courts have limited the reach of private rights of action, thus
limiting litigants’ ability to demonstrate standing.71 More importantly
for data breach litigants, many consumer protection statutes featuring
private rights of action do not apply to the breached entities, preventing
the victims from asserting the statutory interest.
In the absence of broad federal action, states have led the charge
on data privacy legislation, and a number of states have included
private rights of action in statutes specifically devoted to giving
individuals legal recourse when their data is released.72 Breach
notification statutes require breached entities to notify those who have
had their personal information accessed. 73 These notification statutes
were central in setting rules of the road for how companies or
government agencies should respond to a breach.74 Today, all fifty
68. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat.
1952 (amending the FCRA); In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625,
630, 641 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiffs had standing when they sued under the FCRA’s
private right of action and argued that the defendant had improperly “furnished” information in
violation of the FCRA).
69. Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 910 (7th Cir. 2017).
70. E.g., Personal Data Notification and Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 3806, 115th Cong. (2017)
(seeking to establish a national standard with regard to data breach notification); Personal Data
Privacy and Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th Cong. (2014) (detailing that the purpose of the
bill is to “prevent and mitigate identity theft, to ensure privacy, to provide notice of security
breaches, and to enhance criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and other protections
against security breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of personally identifiable information”).
71. See infra Section III.B (discussing private rights of action and their application to data
breach suits).
72. See Taryn Elliott, Comment, Standing a Chance: Does Spokeo Preclude Claims Alleging
the Violation of Certain State Data Breach Laws, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 233, 242–47 (2018)
(detailing the development of private rights of action, specifically in California, Washington, and
New Hampshire).
73. See Michael Bloom, Note, Protecting Personal Data: A Model Data Security and Breach
Notification Statute, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 977, 987–88 (2018) (generally describing covered
entities and notification requirements).
74. California was the first to pass such a law, and did so in 2003. See Press Release, Office
of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., Attorney General Becerra and Assemblymember Levine Unveil
Legislation to Strengthen Data Breach Notification Law (Feb. 21, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/
news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-and-assemblymember-levine-unveil-legislation-
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states have some form of a breach notification statute.75 Many of these
statutes give a certain number of days by which notification must
occur and also require that notification occurs without
“unreasonable delay.”76
Current enforcement of these notification statutes is largely
based on attorneys general and civil penalties, not private rights of
action.77 Civil penalties are a standard punishment, and a state may
allow its attorney general to enforce violations on behalf of victims78 or
rely on the attorney general to enforce on behalf of the state. 79 Penalties
from delayed notification may create incentives to tell consumers in a
reasonable time.80 But absent additional evidence of misuse to sustain
a more traditional negligence claim, consumers are still generally left
without recourse when they are not notified within a reasonable time
that their information has been compromised.81

strengthen [https://perma.cc/ZTZ4-VEPT] (“In 2003, California became the first state to pass a
data breach notification law requiring companies to disclose breaches of personal information to
California consumers whose personal information was, or was reasonably believed to have been,
acquired by an unauthorized person.”).
75. See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
(Sept. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/ERX7-M2AW] (compiling statutes).
76. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-38-5(b) (2018) (“[W]ithout unreasonable delay” with a 45-day
maximum); FLA. STAT. § 501.171(3)(a) (2019) (“[A]s expeditiously as practicable” with a 30-day
maximum); see also Substitute H.B. 1071, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 2019) (amending WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.255 (2019) to shorten the maximum allotted time for covered entities to respond
from forty-five to thirty days).
77. See Madelyn Tarr, Law Firm Cybersecurity: The State of Preventative and Remedial
Regulation Governing Data Breaches in the Legal Profession, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 234, 239
(2017) (outlining the general differences in timing and enforcement in state notification statutes).
78. E.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (LexisNexis 2019).
79. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552(L) (2019) (“[O]nly the attorney general may
enforce . . . a violation . . . .”); IDAHO CODE § 28-51-107 (2019) (“[T]he primary regulator may bring
a civil action to enforce compliance . . . .”).
80. See People v. Uber Techs., No. CGC-18-570124, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 5119, at *5–15
(Sept. 26, 2018) (detailing the steps that Uber must take after delaying breach notification and
committing other statutory violations, including paying $148 million in penalties that were split
among various states and complying with a Breach Notification Plan overseen by the California
Attorney General); see also Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., California Attorney
General Becerra, San Francisco District Attorney Gascón Announce $148 Million Settlement with
Uber over 2016 Data Breach and Cover-Up (Sept. 26, 2018), https://oag.ca.gov/news/pressreleases/california-attorney-general-becerra-san-francisco-district-attorney-gasc%C3%B3n
[https://perma.cc/88KY-VV9R] (summarizing the nationwide settlement).
81. See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 695 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting
that “delay in notification is not a cognizable injury” meriting Article III standing (citing Price v.
Starbucks Corp., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174 (Ct. App. 2011))); Antman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-cv01175-LB, 2015 WL 6123054, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015) (“Mr. Antman also did not plead
injury related to the delay; delay alone is not enough.”); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp.
3d 1197, 1217–18 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding that the plaintiffs had not established Article III
standing for their delayed notification claim because they had “not allege[d] that they suffered any
incremental harm as a result of the delay”).
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II. ANALYSIS
A. The Three Factors That Contribute to
Divergent Results in the Circuits
Divergent results in the circuits over whether the risk of future
identity theft is sufficient to confer standing is not new; it has been
developing since 2011.82 As it stands, the Second,83 Third,84 Fourth,85
and Eighth86 Circuits have declined to extend standing based on a
substantial risk of injury after an alleged breach. On the other hand,
the D.C.,87 Sixth,88 Seventh,89 and Ninth90 Circuits have found that the
82. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43–46 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that alleged
victims of data breach did not have standing and splitting from the Ninth Circuit, which decided
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), a year earlier).
83. See Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that
plaintiff lacked standing because she did not plead how her old credit card number could be linked
to future identity theft after her credit card information was accessed during a breach and
fraudulent charges were made on the card, but she never had to pay for the charges).
84. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45 (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing for lack of evidence
that the hacker read, copied and understood the data). But see In re Horizon Healthcare Servs.
Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639–41 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that victims of breach had
standing because FCRA claim was meant to protect against the same injury as common law actions
and that Congress had thus intended to have FCRA violation count as legally cognizable injury).
85. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 271–76 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiff did not
have standing when there was no evidence that the thief stole laptop with intent to access
the information).
86. See In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 768–72 (8th
Cir. 2017) (holding that risk of future identity theft was insufficient to confer standing when
evidence was presented that victims of data breaches may not suffer identity theft for years or at
all). But see Kuhns v. Scottrade, 868 F.3d 711, 715–16 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding plaintiff has
standing based on losing the value of his bargain when defendant was contractually obligated to
take reasonable safeguards to protect plaintiff’s personal information but was still hacked).
87. See In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 54–61 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (conferring standing where there was evidence the Chinese conducted the hack and evidence
of fraudulent charges for part of the class); Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (holding that standing exists “simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data” that
was taken).
88. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 387–88 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding
that plaintiff has standing based on statistics that data-breach victims are 9.6 times more likely
to experience fraud and on the hours spent on fraud mitigation as a result of the breach).
89. See Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, 828–30 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding
that spending time notifying businesses of new account numbers and changing credit card
numbers on accounts with automatic payments is sufficiently specific to qualify as an injury in
fact); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that the
risk of future identity theft was substantial because the hack was “targeted” and was an
intentional theft of credit card numbers); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634–40 (7th
Cir. 2007) (equating risk of identity theft with the risk of exposure to toxic substances and the use
of defective medical devices and finding that the risk was substantial enough to confer standing).
90. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027–29
(9th Cir. 2018) (finding that risk of identity theft after hack of credit card records was sufficient to
confer standing and that the fact that part of class had experienced fraud raised the risk for the
other part of the class); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)
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post-breach risk of injury is a substantial risk sufficient to establish
standing. As with all cases, the first differentiator in many of these
cases is the facts involved. Factual differences contribute to some, but
not all, of the differing results in the circuits. The divergent results also
center around the application of three factors: (1) whether the hack of
an entity involved sufficient targeting of the stolen information to raise
the threat of misuse to a substantial risk,91 (2) the nature of the
breached information,92 and (3) whether any other victims of the breach
have actually had their data misused.93 The actual “splits” among the
circuits are much smaller than the divergent results suggest.
The circuits are also divided over whether mitigation costs—
which are present, not future, injuries—can confer standing, but
following Clapper’s commands,94 this divide is wholly dependent upon
whether a court finds the underlying risk of misuse sufficiently
substantial.95 The Second Circuit is the only circuit to hold that a
plaintiff lacked standing after she spent time and money in the
aftermath of actual attempted misuse of her compromised data.96 That
decision was a bit of an outlier. Unlike many other data breach suits,
which often become class actions, the plaintiff in that suit was the only
plaintiff, making it more difficult for her to allege future misuse after
she had already changed her credit card information. 97 The Second
Circuit case is even more of an outlier because other circuits have held
that evidence of attempted misuse amounts to an injury in fact,98 and
the plaintiff’s attorneys failed to allege any specifics about the time or
effort “that [the plaintiff] herself” expended monitoring her credit.99
(conferring standing based on the threat of future identity theft after company laptop containing
unencrypted personal information was stolen).
91. See infra Section II.A (discussing the impact of intentionality on standing).
92. See infra Section II.A.2 (examining how the nature of the information breached
affects standing).
93. See infra Section II.A.3 (illustrating the effect of proven misuses of breached data on the
standing inquiry).
94. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013) (“[Plaintiffs] cannot
manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical
future harm that is not certainly impending.”).
95. See Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017) (refusing to grant
standing because the plaintiff’s claims of lost time and effort monitoring credit and finances were
not specific enough).
96. Id. at 90–91.
97. Id. at 90.
98. See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding
that fraudulent charges that led to no money lost can lead to standing based on the loss of value
of time and money spent in response).
99. Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 91. Listing the Second Circuit with the other circuits that have
denied standing glosses over the facts of these individual cases, and once those facts are taken into
account, a common thread appears focusing on the factors listed infra.
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The more prototypical data breach suit leading to standing
questions involves victims who spend time and money to prevent their
information from being misused and file suit before any attempted
misuse takes place.100 The underlying harm then becomes future
misuse—either potential identity theft or account fraud. In such cases,
courts tend to base their decision to confer standing on a combination
of the three factors above (intentionality, the nature of the data, and
misuse of a segment of the breached data). Courts may deny standing
because (1) there is insufficient intent to misuse the compromised
data;101 (2) the compromised data is not the type that could plausibly102
lead to identity theft;103 or (3) one plaintiff’s demonstrated misuse does
not increase the risk of identity theft for the other plaintiff-victims.104
It is the combination of these factors—in addition to the varying facts—
that makes analyzing the divergent results complex. This Part extracts
the factors from the cases to show how the factors explain the divergent
results in the circuits, and Section III.A proposes how the Supreme
Court should deal with in any divisions within the factors.
1. Intentionality
Data breaches occur largely in one of two ways: an entity’s
informational security system is accessed by an unauthorized party,
potentially leading to information being copied,105 or a customer’s
information is physically stolen, often through the theft of a laptop

100. See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (discussing
incurrence of mitigation costs after social security numbers, customer names, and other personal
information was stolen from a health insurer).
101. See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[P]laintiffs have uncovered
no evidence that the information contained on the stolen laptop has been accessed or misused or
that they have suffered identity theft, nor, for that matter, that the thief stole the laptop with the
intent to steal their private information.”).
102. Because standing is a threshold issue, it is typically addressed through motions to dismiss
at the pleading stage, meaning that plaintiffs must merely plausibly allege a substantial risk of
harm. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 627 (“[K]eeping in mind the light burden of proof the plaintiffs bear
at the pleading stage, [the question] is whether the complaint plausibly alleges that the plaintiffs
now face a substantial risk of identity theft as a result of [the defendant’s] alleged negligence in
the data breach.”). Indeed, all the cases involved in the divergent results in the circuits were at
the pleading stage. See supra notes 82–90 (collecting cases).
103. Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90–91 (holding that there was no risk of future identity theft
where the plaintiff had already changed her card information after it was compromised).
104. See In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 769–74 (8th
Cir. 2017) (denying standing to all plaintiffs, except the one that could demonstrate misuse).
105. Compare Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42–46 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that mere
access without evidence of reading, copying, and understanding is insufficient to create a
substantial risk of identity theft), with Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th
Cir. 2015) (holding that identity theft was a substantial risk after a hack stealing credit
card numbers).
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containing such information.106 Some circuits have been willing to find
that plaintiffs claiming negligence have standing in both instances.107
Others have denied that mere access by an unauthorized person creates
a sufficient risk of identity theft108 or that the theft of physical property
plausibly implies that the contents of the property will be accessed and
then used to harm the plaintiffs.109 Those courts denying standing focus
on the assumptions necessary to conclude that the plaintiffs will one
day be subject to identity theft.110 Of paramount concern to these courts
is the assumption that the hacker, or a party to whom she sells the data,
intends to use the compromised data for identity theft.
Beck v. McDonald from the Fourth Circuit serves as an
illustrative example of an alleged breach from the theft of physical
property. In that case, a Veterans Affairs (“VA”) laptop was stolen from
a hospital, and pathology records of patients were lost. 111 The class of
plaintiffs sued, citing previously decided Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuit decisions to argue that the unauthorized dissemination of their
information by the VA put them at a substantial risk of identity theft.112
The Fourth Circuit distinguished those cases by asserting that the data
thief in those cases had “intentionally targeted” the compromised data;
whereas, in this case, there was no evidence the person who stole the

106. See, e.g., Beck, 848 F.3d at 266–67 (stolen laptop at veterans affairs hospital and lost
pathology reports at same hospital); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir.
2010) (Starbucks laptop with unencrypted employee information); In re Horizon Healthcare Servs.
Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 629–30 (3d Cir. 2017) (two of health insurer’s laptops containing
personal information).
107. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 628–29 (holding that plaintiffs had standing after breach of health
insurer); Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (finding standing after theft of laptop). Notably, this Section
focuses on negligence claims rather than breach of contract claims because those claims are
present, not future, injuries, and when plaintiffs plausibly plead a breach, courts confer standing.
See Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 715–16 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that a plaintiff had
standing when he could demonstrate that a company had agreed to protect his information and
failed to do so); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 72–75 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that plaintiff
did not have standing based on breach of contract because pleadings were insufficient to create
even an implied contract).
108. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 768–70 (finding lack of standing based on bare
assertion that data breaches facilitate identity theft when no personally identifying information
was stolen); Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43 (holding that allegations of an increased risk of identity theft
resulting from a security breach are insufficient to secure standing).
109. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 273–76 (holding that laptop and records theft did not create a
substantial risk of identity theft).
110. See id. at 269, 275 (listing the assumptions necessary to ultimately arrive at identity theft
and holding that they were too speculative).
111. Id. at 266–67.
112. Id. at 274 (first citing Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir.
2016); then citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007); and then citing
Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1139).
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laptop or who currently had the pathology reports did so with the intent
or capability of using that information against the plaintiffs.113
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit faced similar facts in Krottner v.
Starbucks Corp., but came to the opposite result.114 In that case, a
laptop with personnel data of Starbucks employees was stolen, and the
court held that the plaintiffs had pled an injury in fact because the
prospect of future misuse by the thief presented an “actual injury”
under a pre-Clapper injury-in-fact test.115 Krottner and Beck present a
true split over standing in physical breaches. But because Krottner was
the first major data breach case decided pre-Clapper, the Fourth
Circuit’s analysis in Beck is more consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. The Fourth Circuit’s analysis also implicitly applies the
intentionality test developed in the circuits by assessing whether the
thief had targeted or stolen the laptop in order to steal the data
contained on the laptop.116 The Ninth Circuit, however, continues to cite
Krottner as justification for finding an injury in fact in hacking cases,
despite the Fourth Circuit’s post-Clapper analysis.117
The second type of breach—hacked data—is more (in)famous
because of the large numbers of records associated with the breaches.118
Before describing the split over whether a hacker demonstrates
sufficient intentionality to lead to a substantial risk of harm, it is
helpful to address the First Circuit’s decision in Katz v. Pershing,
LLC.119 In Katz, the plaintiff alleged that a company’s security was
insufficient and would allow for unauthorized access to the plaintiff’s
data.120 The First Circuit denied standing because no unauthorized
access had occurred yet, and the potential for breach was insufficient to
create an injury.121 The fact that no breach had occurred differentiates
this case from the other cases in which courts conferred standing.122

113. Id.
114. 628 F.3d at 1140.
115. Id. at 1140, 1142.
116. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (noting that plaintiffs made no claims that the laptop was
targeted in order to steal the data it contained).
117. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th
Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged standing based on the risk of
identity theft).
118. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Equifax Breach Affected 147 Million, but Most Sit Out
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/business/equifaxbreach-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/J3BP-D3HG] (noting that 147 million customers of
Equifax were affected by the data breach that resulted in a massive settlement).
119. 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012).
120. Id. at 78–80.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 80.
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However, even if plaintiffs allege a breach, they can run into
trouble if they cannot or do not plead that a thief downloaded or
processed the plaintiffs’ data, rather than alleging the thief merely
gained access to it. 123 This precise scenario was at issue in Reilly v.
Ceridian. The Reilly plaintiffs alleged that a hacker had penetrated a
company’s firewall, and the Third Circuit denied standing because the
plaintiffs did not allege that the hacker “read, copied, and understood”
the information.124 Though both were decided pre-Clapper, Reilly and
Katz help lay out how to analyze cases in which plaintiffs allege that
their data has been negligently handled. Plaintiffs must allege a breach
and allege that the breach led to a theft of their data.
Reilly also helped develop the intentionality factor. The Third
Circuit differentiated Reilly from another breach case by arguing that
a hacker merely accessing the information does not demonstrate the
“intrusion was intentional.”125 Because the case was pre-Clapper, the
Third Circuit applied the stricter “certainly impending” standard
rather than the “substantial risk” test. 126 However, despite applying an
old standard, Reilly is still important because of the Third Circuit’s
focus on the intentionality of the breach in the standing analysis.
Since Reilly, multiple circuits have assessed the intents of the
hackers as a way of determining whether there is a “substantial risk” of
data misuse.127 The most often cited reasoning for finding adequate
intent for standing comes from the Seventh Circuit in Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Group, LLC: “Why else would hackers break into a
store’s database and steal consumers’ private information? Presumably,
the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges
or assume those consumers’ identities.” 128 In Remijas, a hacker stole the
credit card numbers of Nieman Marcus customers. 129 In addition to its
oft-cited rhetorical question, the circuit court reasoned there was a
“substantial risk” under Clapper because there was no need to speculate
that the customer’s information had been stolen.130 It was thus

123. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs had no
standing when there was no evidence that the “intrusion was intentional” nor that the hacker did
anything but access the data).
124. Id. at 42.
125. See id. at 44 (differentiating the case from Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629
(7th Cir. 2007)).
126. Id. at 42–43.
127. See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
128. 794 F.3d at 693; see also Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 389 (quoting Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693).
129. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690.
130. Id. at 693–94.
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plausible to infer that the purpose of the hack was to use the customer
information.131 The D.C. Circuit has used the same reasoning to argue
that identity theft is the ultimate conclusion of a data breach of
consumers’ data.132 This intentionality analysis in hacking cases has
become the dominant trend among the circuits.
While other courts have presented different results,133 no circuit
has applied the intentionality analysis and denied standing in a
hacking case. The circuit courts that have denied standing in hacking
cases have instead focused largely on the second factor, the nature of
the information.134 For instance, in In re SuperValu, the Eighth Circuit
did not attempt to reconcile its divergent result “because the cases
ultimately turned on the substance of the allegations before each
court.”135 The court instead held that some plaintiffs lacked standing
because the theft of credit card information and the statistics cited by
the plaintiffs about the risk of misuse did not generate a “substantial
risk” of injury.136 The Eighth Circuit’s decision to focus on cited
statistics rather than the intentionality analysis does not create a
strong legal “split,” but by ignoring the intentionality factor, the circuit
court implicitly held that a thief intentionally targeting credit card
information was not sufficient to create standing. The Eighth Circuit’s
decision—either ignoring the intentionality analysis or denying that an
intentional hack created a “substantial risk” of misuse—clearly splits
from the Seventh and D.C. Circuits.
The other circuits that have denied standing to data breach
litigants who have not experienced misuse of their data have applied
the intentionality analysis in a way that does not present a legal “split,”
despite creating divergent results. Recall that the Fourth Circuit case
involved the theft of a laptop, not a hack in which a data thief targets a

131. See id. at 690, 693–94 (“At this stage in the litigation, it is plausible to infer that the
plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach.”).
132. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 628–29 (“No long sequence of uncertain contingencies involving
multiple independent actors has to occur before the plaintiffs in this case will suffer any harm; a
substantial risk of harm exists already, simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data
that the plaintiffs allege was taken.”).
133. The cases from the Second and Eighth Circuits present the divergent results. See In re
SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 768–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding
that there was not a substantial risk of future identity theft or fraud for the plaintiffs that had not
yet experienced misuse); Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017)
(denying standing after customer data was hacked).
134. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 766 (addressing credit card information, including
card verification value (CVV)); Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90 (addressing credit card data). Section
II.B also addresses the nature of the information and provides more detail on why the nature of
the information can affect the standing analysis.
135. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769.
136. Id. at 771–72.
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consumer’s information after bypassing security.137 And the Third
Circuit’s case was not a true hacking case because the plaintiffs did not
plead that their information was actually accessed by an unauthorized
party.138 Both of those cases require additional inferences—that the
thief knew how to access the data on the laptop and would do so rather
than sell the laptop as expensive hardware and that the hacker
accessed the data and downloaded it without leaving a trace. The
necessity of those inferences diminishes the intentionality of the breach
and weakens the overall chain of inferences leading to the ultimate
harm, making the risk of identity theft too speculative.139
Despite the apparent clarity in the circuits about the application
of the intentionality factor (when it is applied), there is a strong
argument that its application remains flawed. By ignoring the
intentionality analysis and deciding on general statistics, the Eighth
Circuit missed an opportunity to expand on the Fourth Circuit’s
analysis in Beck.140 Without clear direction on what is considered
sufficiently “imminent,” courts are trying to discern what is
“substantial” under Clapper. But the Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits’
logic—that a hack will “sooner or later” lead to misuse 141—seems to
ignore the reality of what happens to personal data after it is
compromised through a hack.142
After a thief has copied the data, she need not use the data for
identity theft immediately or even ultimately in order to profit. 143
Indeed, hackers can—and do—repackage information for sale on the
dark web rather than go through the effort of trying to conduct identity

137. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing the physical
theft case at bar from hacking cases).
138. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing the facts at
issue from other hacking cases where the plaintiff alleged that the data was “read, copied,
and understood”).
139. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 273–75.
140. See id. at 273–74.
141. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015); see Attias v.
CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“No long sequence of uncertain contingencies
involving multiple independent actors has to occur before the plaintiffs in this case will suffer any
harm; a substantial risk of harm exists already, simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the
data that the plaintiffs allege was taken.”); see also Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F.
App’x 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693).
142. Note a hack is distinct from a breach associated with the theft of physical records, but the
same logic would apply as the thief must merely offload the information or digitize the records.
143. Brian Stack, Here’s How Much Your Personal Information Is Selling for on the Dark Web,
EXPERIAN (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-much-yourpersonal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-web/ [https://perma.cc/HZ4V-ZX96] (noting the
range of prices that various data can fetch on the dark web).
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theft themselves.144 With this knowledge, the chain of inferences is
filled with more and more possibilities, resting “on speculation about
the decisions of independent actors.” 145 Furthermore, there is every
incentive to misuse the data quickly—before companies are aware of
the breach and before consumers can put up precautions—decreasing
the strength of each individual inference in the chain of actors as a case
drags on.146
Inferring the intent of third parties also seems to be the exact
sort of speculation that the Court cautioned against in Clapper.147 At
times, the Court has allowed intent to establish standing and has even
implied that an analysis of intent is appropriate to assess standing. But
in those circumstances, the intent assessed was one of the parties—not
a third party. Like in Clapper,148 analyzing the intent of third parties
primarily arises in cases in which plaintiffs are trying to establish the
likelihood that the government will commit a specific act,149 but the
Court has also looked to the intent of plaintiffs to establish an injury in
fact.150 In a typical data breach case, however, the intent in question is
that of a third party: the hacker (or her potential buyers).
In a world where “substantial risk” of future injury is the
standard, however, courts must infer something about the future,
necessarily implicating the actions of possible third parties. So while
the Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits’ explanation seemingly goes a bit
too far under Clapper, this step of assessing intentionality is where
144. See Dion & Smith, supra note 20, at 263–66 (detailing the layout of the dark web and the
steps that hackers go to in order to resell compromised data rather than use it for identity
theft themselves).
145. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013).
146. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that the more time
that passes, the more speculative injuries from breaches become); Robert Elgart, The Data Black
Market: Where Hackers Take Stolen Data, TURN-KEY TECHS. (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.turnkeytechnologies.com/blog/article/the-data-black-market-where-hackers-take-stolen-data/
[https://perma.cc/Y5QD-UTK2] (noting that this speed is particularly relevant for credit
card theft).
147. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 (noting that the Court has a “usual reluctance to endorse
standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors”).
148. See id. at 407 (“[Plaintiffs] claim that there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that
their communications will be acquired [by the government] at some point in the future, thus
causing them injury.”).
149. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983) (unsuccessfully trying
to base standing on the intent of the police to continue using a chokehold policy).
150. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (holding that a plaintiff
can establish injury in fact via a threat of prosecution if the plaintiff “alleges ‘an intention to
engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a
statute’ ” (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979))). Cf. Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (“ ‘[S]ome day’ intentions—without any description of concrete
plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of
the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”).
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circuits have to start when assessing the risk of future identity theft.
The level of intentionality helps differentiate hacks where information
was specifically targeted from those where the data was potentially
incidental to another theft or hack.151 A stolen laptop itself has value,
decreasing the likelihood that the data was stolen for the purpose of
identity theft—especially if the information was encrypted.152 While
inferences about a third party are necessary, and the circuits have not
confronted the reality of the market for personal data, hacking cases do
present fewer inferences than those made in Clapper because the bad
act—the hack—has already occurred; it is not speculative like the
surveillance in Clapper. Furthermore, Clapper formally applied a
“certainly impending” standard rather than a “substantial risk”
standard, meaning the number of contingencies that were
impermissible in Clapper cannot be applied strictly to data
breach cases.153
2. Nature of the Information
Another factor that contributes to the risk of imminent harm is
the nature of the information disclosed. Primary personally identifying
information—such as social security numbers, birth dates, driver’s
license numbers, or biomedical information—is distinct from certain
financial information, like credit and debit card information.154 And
both of these types of information are more sensitive, and potentially
more harmful, than other types of information that can lead to
identifying an individual, such as names, street addresses, email
addresses (without passwords), and phone numbers—information that
is probably publicly available.155 A victim can change a credit card

151. Compare Beck, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017) (stolen laptop and medical records), and Khan
v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 532–33 (D. Md. 2016) (finding that there was
no standing when the data breach only gave hackers access to email accounts, meaning that they
did not target the personal information of patients when breaching the hospital employees’ email
accounts), with Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (conferring
standing after a hack).
152. Cf. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the data
on the stolen laptop was unencrypted).
153. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401 (noting the application of the “certainly impending” standard).
154. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL I NFORMATION: DATA
BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER,
THE
FULL
EXTENT
IS
UNKNOWN
30
(2007)
[hereinafter
GAO
REPORT],
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf [https://perma.cc/85RM-VB9U] (explaining that
personal information can be used to open new accounts or incur actual financial charges).
155. Alan McQuinn & Daniel Castro, A Grand Bargain on Data Privacy Legislation for
America, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 18 (Jan. 2019), http://www2.itif.org/2019-grandbargain-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG8G-PTC7] (noting that publicly available data is treated
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number fairly easily,156 but it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
change a social security number or medical information.157 These types
of information may be accessed or stolen in a breach, and it is the
release of these data together that presents the bigger issues. The black
market for personal information on the dark web also indicates that
data packages containing personal information, especially social
security numbers linked with financial data, are more valuable,
demonstrating a greater ability for use in identity theft and thus
increasing the ultimate risk of identity theft.158
For standing purposes, canceling the compromised credit or
debit card lowers the risk of identity theft because thieves cannot make
fraudulent purchases with the now-canceled card information. This was
the plaintiff’s problem in Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., a case in
which the plaintiff’s payment card number and expiration date were
compromised.159 The plaintiff’s alleged future injury was that her card
information had been stolen, leading to two attempted uses, and that
she thus faced a risk of future identity fraud.160 The Second Circuit held
that the plaintiff could not possibly face a threat of future fraud because
the plaintiff had changed her card number after the theft and had pled
“no specifics about any time or effort that she herself ha[d] spent
monitoring her credit.”161 The Eighth Circuit has also explicitly held
that compromised credit card information alone is insufficient to confer
standing because no new accounts can be opened with just that
information and because the risk of fraudulent charges is
not “substantial.”162

differently than other personally identifiable information by almost all privacy laws and privacy
law proposals).
156. Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017).
157. See Can I Change My Social Security Number?, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://faq.ssa.gov/enUS/Topic/article/KA-02220 (last modified Nov. 29, 2019) [https://perma.cc/GP3N-Q8T2] (detailing
the steps required to change a social security number and noting that the Social Security
Administration can only assign a new number after a breach if the data breach victim has actually
suffered identity theft and “continues to be disadvantaged by using the original number”).
158. See Ian Gray, Pricing Analysis of Goods in Cybercrime Communities, FLASHPOINT 2
(2019), https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/a-look-at-the-pricing-of-cybercrime-goods-services/
[https://perma.cc/W8HW-D3NU] (detailing that “fullz”—the industry term for data sets that
include name, social security number, date of birth, and account numbers together—typically cost
between four and ten dollars in 2019—and potentially between thirty and sixty dollars if they
include financial information).
159. 689 F. App’x at 89–90.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 90–91.
162. See In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 768, 770–71
(8th Cir. 2017) (pointing to the 2007 GAO report, supra note 154, to show that only a few cases of
card fraud actually resulted from data breaches from 2000 to 2005).
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As articulated in Whalen, the Second Circuit’s position on credit
cards may create a perverse incentive. By the Second Circuit’s logic, if
the plaintiff had waited to change her credit card number until she had
experienced the fraudulent charges, then she would have an injury in
fact sufficient for standing.163 This approach leaves little incentive for
consumers to change their credit card number to prevent fraudulent
charges, even though getting a new credit card number is the
government- and industry- recommended response after a credit card
breach.164 Clapper teaches that plaintiffs cannot “manufacture
standing.”165 But when plaintiffs responsibly follow expert
recommendations to spend time changing a credit card number, they
have suffered an “actual” loss, even if it is only nominal.166 The
mitigation costs incurred to prevent identity fraud are distinct from
those in Clapper because unlike the government surveillance in
Clapper,167 the breach is not “hypothetical,” and the perceived
government and industry consensus on the reasonableness of
mitigation costs demonstrates the legitimacy of the underlying harm.
Perhaps that consensus even makes that harm “substantial.”
In the previously discussed In re SuperValu case, the Eighth
Circuit sided with the Second Circuit and held a data breach that
compromises credit card information does not confer standing.168 Like
163. See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023,
1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing when part of the class experienced
credit card fraud after a breach compromising “names, account numbers, passwords, email
addresses, billing and shipping addresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card
information”); Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that
a plaintiff had standing after a bank took time to restore funds after a fraudulent charge).
164. See Brian O’Connor, 3 Things to Do if Your Credit Card or Debit Card Is Involved in a
Data Breach, EXPERIAN (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/3-things-todo-if-your-credit-card-or-debit-card-is-involved-in-a-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/67UK-4YKS]
(industry recommendation); Lisa Weintraub Schifferle, OPM Data Breach—What Should You Do?,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION: CONSUMER INFO. BLOG (June 4, 2015), https://www.consumer.
ftc.gov/blog/2015/06/opm-data-breach-what-should-you-do?page=3 [https://perma.cc/VE4A-WDS9]
(government recommendation).
165. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013).
166. For instance, in Krottner, two of the plaintiffs spent a “substantial” amount of time
monitoring their bank accounts, and the court granted standing based on a risk of future injury.
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). While documentation on
the amount of time may be necessary to assess the extent of the damages, the point still stands
that the loss is “actual,” using the Court’s language in Lujan. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 564, 564 n.2 (1992) (noting that after “actual” harm has been established, the “precise
extent of harm” may be determined at trial).
167. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401–02, 410 (noting that the costs incurred by the plaintiffs were
done so purely based on fear of surveillance).
168. In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 772 (8th Cir. 2017).
One author has suggested that the Eighth Circuit’s decision necessarily and correctly forecloses
the risk of credit card fraud from being an injury in fact. See Jennifer Wilt, Note, Cancelled Credit
Cards: Substantial Risk of Future Injury as a Basis for Standing in Data Breach Cases, 71 SMU
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with all data breach cases, however, the facts and pleadings are
important. The Eighth Circuit issued a narrow decision based on the
statistics pled in the specific case;169 the court’s decision did not address
credit card information theft more broadly. The Eighth Circuit based
its decision on a Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report in
the record that concluded only three of the twenty-four largest breaches
from 2000 to 2005 resulted in some form of card fraud.170 Unfortunately,
the GAO’s conclusions were not very strong, and the GAO has not
conducted a subsequent study. The court and the report both noted that
“[c]omprehensive information on the outcomes of data breaches is not
available” and that the “extent to which data breaches result in identity
theft is not well known.”171 The court also acknowledged that studies
are not the only means of alleging a substantial risk of harm.172
The lack of empirical data on the likelihood of identity theft
following a data breach is not unique to credit card information.
Searching for empirical data to demonstrate substantial risk, plaintiffs
have also cited studies suggesting that victims of a data breach are 9.5
times more likely to experience identity theft than the general
population173 and that between nineteen and twenty-five percent of
data breach victims report suffering identity fraud.174 Without
providing guidance on what would be considered substantial, courts

L. Rev. 615, 619–20 (2018) (piecing together the GAO Report and In re SuperValu, Inc. to reach
her conclusion). However, given the multiple disclaimers that the Eighth Circuit makes, that is a
mischaracterization. Moreover, that argument would mean that even if a fraudulent charge—
actual account fraud—occurred it would not suffice because the credit card company would
reimburse the individual. See id. (“As the [In re SuperValu, Inc.] court noted . . . there is little risk
of identity theft [based on stolen card information] because unauthorized accounts cannot be
opened with credit card numbers alone. . . . [T]he only risk is fraudulent charges, which can often
be easily remedied without court intervention.” (footnote omitted)).
169. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769 (specifically refusing to reconcile the case at bar
with other circuits “because the cases ultimately turned on the substance of the allegations before
each court”).
170. Id. at 769–70; GAO REPORT, supra note 154, at 24.
171. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 771 (quoting GAO REPORT, supra note 154, at 5, 21).
172. See id. at 770 n.5 (“We recognize there may be other means—aside from relying on reports
and studies—to allege a substantial risk of future injury, and we do not comment on the sufficiency
of such potential methods here.”).
173. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 268, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that plaintiffs argued
that their risk of identity theft was 9.5 times greater than before the breach and that thrity-three
percent of “health-related data breaches result in identity theft”).
174. See Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533 (D. Md. 2016) (citing
the 9.5 times more likely statistic and noting that of those that received data breach notifications,
nineteen percent reported identity fraud); Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d
871, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying—perhaps incorrectly—the “certainly impending” test and
holding that Strautins did not demonstrate that identity theft is “ ‘certainly impending’ for South
Carolina taxpayers like herself”).
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have consistently denied that these statistics are sufficient to qualify as
a substantial risk.175
Courts also note that because these statistics are general, they
do nothing to address the risk that plaintiffs actually face.176 Though
these courts were all rendering decisions after Clapper, some of them177
seemed to exclusively and inappropriately apply the “certainly
impending” test, which should be reserved for rigorous standing
inquiries involving separation of powers or national security, not
assessing the standing of corporate data breach victims.178 Even when
the correct test is applied, however, plaintiffs would be better off not
citing these general statistics at all because courts may use the
statistics against them.179
Though the statistics do not create an apparent split, the
sensitivity of credit card information does. Unlike the Second and
Eighth Circuits,180 the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have found that
compromised credit card information can lead to a substantial risk of
harm for those that have not yet experienced misuse.181 The apparent
split is (once again) not as clean as it seems, however. In the Seventh
Circuit case, Remijas, plaintiffs pled that a significant number of credit
175. See Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 533 (holding that the plaintiff’s statistics are insufficient to
support standing); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.
Supp. 3d 14, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2014) (same); Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 877 (same).
176. See, e.g., Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 n.7 (noting that the “9.5 times more likely” statistic does
not address the specific facts of the case).
177. See, e.g., Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 533 (finding that the “general allegations” about the
likelihood of identity theft were insufficient to establish that it was “certainly impending” and also
holding that the statistics did not create a “substantial risk,” without completely applying the
“substantial risk” test); Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 876–77 (denying standing because
“Strautins . . . failed to meet her burden to establish that identity theft is ‘certainly impending’ ”
even if the plaintiff was at a greater risk of identity theft after a hack that led to the theft of
personal information).
178. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2013) (noting that separation of
powers questions merit an “especially rigorous” standing analysis and that the Court has often
denied standing in cases involving intelligence and foreign affairs (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 819 (1997))).
179. See In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 771 (8th Cir.
2017) (noting that the report cited by plaintiffs concludes that “most breaches have not resulted in
detected incidents of identity theft”) (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 154, at 21); Beck, 848 F.3d
at 276 (concluding that a thirty-three percent risk of identity theft for breach victims is
not “substantial”).
180. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 768–70 (holding that plaintiffs did not have
standing when the thief had not yet used their compromised credit card numbers); Whalen v.
Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017) (denying standing when the plaintiff had
changed her credit card number before attempted misuse).
181. See In re Zappos.com, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th
Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an injury in fact by alleging that credit card
information was taken in the data breach); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688,
690 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that plaintiffs adequately alleged standing when plaintiffs alleged
that credit card information had been exposed in a data breach).
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cards—9,200 of the 350,000 compromised cards—had been misused.182
And in the relevant Ninth Circuit case, more than a dozen instances of
identity theft were reported after a hack of Zappos.com led to
compromised credit card information.183 In contrast to those two cases,
the Eighth Circuit plaintiffs in In re SuperValu pled that only one of
them had suffered misuse post-breach,184 and there was also only one
instance of misuse in the Second Circuit case.185 One instance of misuse
is significantly different from the 9,200 that suffered post-breach abuse
in Remijas,186 and at least marginally different from the more than a
dozen instances of misuse in the Ninth Circuit case.187 These
distinctions make it easier to reconcile the cases and avoid a
quintessential “split” on whether compromised credit card information
alone is sufficient to create a substantial risk. On the other hand, the
factual differences in the cases make it difficult to conclude that credit
card information alone—without any misuse of part of the compromised
data, as was the case in the Seventh188 and Ninth189 Circuits—would be
sufficient to create standing.
One other feature of stolen information plays an important role
in the risk of identity theft post-breach: encryption. When data is
encrypted, the hacker decrypting the data is an additional inference
that the court must make to reach the ultimate identity theft.190 This is
particularly relevant in stolen records or stolen laptop cases in which
data on the stolen device was unencrypted.191 Lowering the likelihood
182. 794 F.3d at 690.
183. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d at 1027 (noting that other victims of the breach
experiencing identity theft can support the contention that identity theft is possible—and thus
that the likelihood of identity theft is higher); Brief of Appellants (Redacted) at 31-32, In re
Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020 (No. 16-16860) (detailing the
number of victims that had suffered financial losses).
184. 870 F.3d at 768.
185. Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90.
186. 794 F.3d at 690.
187. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d at 1027.
188. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690.
189. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d at 1027 (“[The misuse of some of the compromised
credit cards] undermines Zappos’ assertion that the data stolen in the breach cannot be used for
fraud or identity theft.”). This leads into the final factor that explains the results in the cases, a
factor that I address in the next Section. To foreshadow a bit, because part of the compromised
data had already been misused in the Ninth Circuit case, the inference that the rest of the data
may be misused was easier to draw, increasing the risk of misuse. Id.
190. See In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp.
3d 14, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying that a substantial risk of harm existed and listing the
decryption of the stolen data as a step in the chain of inferences necessary to infer future harm).
191. Compare Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (granting
standing when laptops with unencrypted employee data were stolen), with In re Sci. Applications
Int’l Corp., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 25 (denying standing where data tapes that would have to be
decrypted were among items stolen).

5 – Urness_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1546

10/13/2020 4:23 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:5:1517

of standing based on responsibly encrypted data is an added incentive
for companies to encrypt their data, which is an important step in
limiting the overall likelihood of data breaches and any subsequent
identity theft.192
To summarize, the circuits have properly noted that the
sensitivity of data—depending on whether it is personally identifiable
information, financial information, or already publicly disclosed—
contributes to the risk of misuse. While there is apparent disagreement
over whether compromised credit card information can create standing,
no circuit has completely written off the prospect, and other factors—
such as the cited empirical studies193 or insufficiently precise
pleadings194—may also explain the denial of standing in those cases.
Either way, the point remains that social security numbers and other
personally identifiable information have a higher risk of causing a
plaintiff harm than the release of credit card information. Furthermore,
some courts have noted that if one or more of the compromised credit
cards is misused, then the likelihood of potential misuse of the rest of
the compromised credit cards increases, creating a substantial risk of
future harm.195
3. Proven Misuse of Only Some Victims’ Data
The third factor used by circuits is evidence of misuse of some of
the stolen data. Some circuits have allowed misuse of part of a
compromised dataset to raise the risk that a victim’s data will be
misused, even if that victim’s data is in a part of the compromised data
that has not yet been misused.196 As outlined above, however, the
Eighth Circuit has held that even where one plaintiff can demonstrate
fraudulent charges or attempted misuse sufficient to confer standing,
192. See Rick Robinson, Three Lessons from the Target Hack of Encrypted PIN Data, SEC.
INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 9, 2014), https://securityintelligence.com/target-hack-encrypted-pin-datathree-lessons/ [https://perma.cc/N2DY-FY86] (“[E]ncrypted data thwarts the incentive to steal
the data.”).
193. In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 771 (8th Cir. 2017).
194. See Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017):
[Plaintiff] pleaded no specifics about any time or effort that she herself has spent
monitoring her credit. Her complaint alleges only that “consumers must expend
considerable time” on credit monitoring, and that she “and the Class suffered additional
damages based on the opportunity cost and value of time that [she] and the Class have
been forced to expend to monitor their financial and bank accounts.”
(alteration in original).
195. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that if part of
the compromised data set has been misused, then the probability of credit card misuse increases—
a future injury that would require time and effort to prevent).
196. Compare Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (finding standing), with In re SuperValu, Inc., 870
F.3d at 768–72 (denying standing).
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the risk of misuse is still insufficient for the remainder of the plaintiffs
who cannot demonstrate misuse.197 This is at odds with the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits' holdings, which have allowed evidence of misuse by
part of a plaintiff class to augment the risk of identity theft for the rest
of the class.198
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ position is more consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, which allows a putative class to proceed if
one named plaintiff has standing.199 Confusingly, the Eighth Circuit
acknowledged the precedent but then seemingly ignored it by refusing
to find standing for the class.200 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit’s
analysis seems incomplete, even considering the GAO report it cites: if
it is true that only a small number of data breaches do lead to account
fraud, the presence of account fraud in part of the class would seem to
suggest that this is the kind of breach that would lead to such harm.201
*

*

*

This Part demonstrated that the circuit “split” is not as much of
a split as it seems. Much of the intentionality factor’s apparent split can
be explained by factual differences, particularly the demonstrated level
of unauthorized access. Credit card information alone is less sensitive
than other personally identifiable information and may not suffice to
create standing. But misuse of part of the compromised credit
card information can elevate the threat of credit card fraud to a
substantial risk.
The third factor can also help create standing for plaintiffs who
might lose out under the first factor if the Supreme Court decides to
take a strict approach that leans against inferring the actions of third

197. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769–70 (“With the exception of [one] plaintiff . . . the
named plaintiffs have not alleged that they have suffered fraudulent charges on their credit or
debit cards or that fraudulent accounts have been opened in their names.”).
198. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d at 1027–28 (finding that risk of identity theft after
hack of credit card records was sufficient to confer standing, and that the fact that part of class
had experienced fraud raised the risk for the other part of the class); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2015) (conferring standing based on future injury after
a hack of credit card information and emphasizing that plaintiffs had alleged that “9,200 cards
[had] experienced fraudulent charges so far”); Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (conferring standing
based on the threat of future identity theft after company laptop containing unencrypted personal
information was stolen).
199. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446 (2009); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9 (1977).
200. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 768 (citing Horne, 557 U.S. at 446; Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 264 n.9).
201. See id. at 769–71 (indicating that at least one named plaintiff alleged that they had
suffered fraudulent charges on their credit card); supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text.
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parties—a possibility suggested by Clapper.202 In Section III.A, this
Note explains how the Supreme Court could provide clarity to lower
courts by enunciating positions on these factors and establishing a test
for injury in fact for data breach cases. Specifically, the Court should (1)
find that the mere fact of the breach alone is sufficient to demonstrate
intentionality, (2) reject decade-old statistics on the likelihood of misuse
of plaintiffs’ information and assign import to the sensitivity of the
breached information, and (3) side with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
and hold that demonstrated misuse of some of the information increases
the risk of misuse for the rest of the victims.
B. Private Rights of Action Applied to Data Breach Litigation
Instead of arguing that the risk of future misuse is a substantial
risk, a limited number of data breach victims can argue that a company
injured them by violating a statute with a common law interest.203 The
Supreme Court’s Spokeo decision made clear that not all violations of a
statute suffice to create an injury in fact, even if the statute provides a
private right of action.204 Specifically, a mere procedural injury is not
“legally cognizable,”205 but the line between a mere procedural injury
and a legally cognizable injury is a fine one. Breaking down the analysis
into a number of steps is helpful.
Similar to the uncertainty surrounding the “substantial risk”
test under Clapper, following Spokeo, federal courts try to divine
whether Congress intended to create a concrete interest in a statute.206
Then, if an interest is discerned, the court decides whether the plaintiff
has alleged a violation of that interest.207 If the plaintiff does not allege
a violation of the interest intended by Congress, the plaintiff has one
202. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013) (commenting that the Court has
a “usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of
independent actors”).
203. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639–41 (3d Cir.
2017) (finding standing in a data breach suit based on congressional intent that the FCRA protect
the same interest as common law privacy torts).
204. See Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury
even in the context of a statutory violation.”).
205. See id. (“[A plaintiff] could not, for example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced
from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”).
206. See, e.g., In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc., 846 F.3d 625, 638–39 (analyzing the holding
of Spokeo and concluding that Congress intended to confer standing to enforce violations of
the FCRA).
207. See Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 346–47 (4th Cir. 2017) (identifying
“ensur[ing] fair and accurate credit reporting, promot[ing] efficiency in the banking system, and
protect[ing] consumer privacy” as the interests Congress intended to create in the FCRA and
finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that the statutory violation would make any
difference to any of those interests (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007))).
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more bite at the apple: the court will examine whether the statutory
violation that the plaintiff is alleging has a sufficiently “close
relationship” to a common law interest to rise to “legally cognizable”
under Spokeo.208 The private right of action in a statute then allows the
individual to vindicate that interest at law.209
This chain of reasoning adds to the uncertainty for data breach
litigants who have not suffered pecuniary damages because it relies
heavily on the text of a statute—whether the statute covers the
breached entity or the breached information,210 whether the individual
suing is under the class protected by the statutory interest and by the
private right of action,211 and whether the interest is “close” to one at
common law.212 These various steps demonstrate the possible pitfalls of
trying to use a statutory private right of action to establish liability and
may explain why relatively few data breach plaintiffs are able to
successfully use private rights of action to establish standing.
Across the circuits, this process of identifying a statutory
interest in order to confer standing has led to mixed results for
plaintiffs. Some circuits have looked at the specific provisions in the
Fair Credit Reporting Act that are cited by a plaintiff to determine
whether those provisions create a statutory interest (a “legally
cognizable interest”) that the Act’s private right of action allows

208. See, e.g., In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1215–16 (C.D.
Cal. 2017) (providing an overview of the history of privacy torts and finding that the claimed injury
protected by the statutes at issue, the Video Privacy Protection Act and the Wiretap Act, was
sufficiently close to the common law torts of “intrusion upon seclusion” and “disclosure of
information in breach of a confidential relationship”).
209. Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 186–90 (2d Cir. 2016), provides the archetype
that other circuits, including the Ninth Circuit in Spokeo II, 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017),
have followed when assessing whether a private right of action allows for an individual to vindicate
a statutory right or whether the private right of action provision does not allow for the plaintiff to
establish standing because the interest was merely procedural and not substantive.
210. The FCRA only covers consumer reporting. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e (2012). This leads to a gap
in covering even data breaches of consumer reporting agencies. Perhaps one of the best examples
of this gap in coverage came in litigation surrounding the Equifax breach. In one of the Equifax
cases, a federal district court dismissed an FCRA claim because the information disclosed did not
constitute a “consumer report,” even though the information consisted of names, credit card
numbers, social security numbers, dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, credit addresses, and
tax identification numbers. In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d
1295, 1308, 1313–14 (N.D. Ga. 2019).
211. See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 739 F. App’x 91, 96 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of
data breach suit because the claim fell outside of the statute of limitations in the private right of
action); Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 718–19 (8th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of data
breach suit because the statute only covered actions by businesses associated with a sale and
required the plaintiff to suffer a pecuniary loss to fall within the protected class).
212. See supra Section II.
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plaintiffs to vindicate through civil action.213 Others have looked more
broadly, however, at the overall purpose of the FCRA in assessing the
statutory interest at stake.214 The Ninth Circuit has even come out on
both sides, sometimes finding that the statute creates a statutory right
to information and sometimes finding that a statutory violation is
merely procedural and requires a more concrete interest.215
The Third Circuit is the only circuit that has used the presence
of a statutory private right of action in federal legislation to confer
standing in a data breach suit.216 In In re Horizon, the Third Circuit
ruled that plaintiffs had standing when they alleged that the defendant
had improperly “furnish[ed]” their information under the FCRA when
a thief stole the defendant’s laptops containing unencrypted personal
information, including social security numbers.217 The FCRA forbids
the “unauthorized dissemination of personal information by a credit
reporting agency,” which the court found creates a right to privacy that
has “traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
English or American courts.”218 When addressing Spokeo on remand
from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit echoed the Third Circuit’s
holding: the private right of action in the FCRA allowed the plaintiffs
to vindicate a right to privacy that the courts inferred from the
statute.219 Key to both of these post-Spokeo decisions was the courts’
willingness to find a linkage between the common law privacy right and
the interest Congress intended to protect.
However, not all courts have found a private right of action and
a linkage to a common law privacy tort when examining federal
legislation in data breach suits, demonstrating the lack of clarity
existing for those trying to establish standing based on traditional
privacy torts.220 At the circuit level, the Third Circuit handed down its
213. See, e.g., Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2018) (analyzing the
statutory construction of the FCRA and concluding that the provisions in question were meant to
serve substantive interests, not merely procedural ones).
214. See Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc, 856 F.3d 337, 346 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the
plaintiff’s cited interest did not match up with the broad purposes of the Act).
215. Compare Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2018)
(denying standing after a plaintiff was not provided with sufficient opportunity to contest
inaccurate credit information in violation of the Act), with Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 499–
500 (9th Cir. 2017) (conferring standing based on the right to information and privacy and no other
concrete injury).
216. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639–41 (3d
Cir. 2017) (finding standing in a data breach suit based on congressional intent for the FCRA to
protect the same interest as common law privacy torts).
217. Id. at 630–31, 641 (alteration in original).
218. Id. at 639–40 (quoting Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
219. Spokeo II, 867 F.3d 1108, 1115 (2017).
220. See, e.g., Spokeo I at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms
does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a
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decision in Kamal v. J. Crew Group, Inc.221 and refined the definition of
common law privacy torts just two years after seemingly expanding
standing to cover most privacy torts in In re Horizon.222 In Kamal, the
plaintiff argued that Congress had contemplated the risk of identity
theft when writing the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
because the congressional record showed that experts recommended
credit card numbers not be printed in full on receipts for fear of
criminals getting their hands on them.223 In In re Horizon, the Third
Circuit found a sufficiently “close relationship” between the common
law privacy tort of unreasonable publicity and the plaintiff’s claim
under the FCRA because both were meant to protect against the
“improper dissemination of information.”224 However, the Kamal court
found that the injury in common law privacy torts, including in breach
of confidence cases, involved the dissemination of personal information
to a third party.225 The court held that Kamal could not demonstrate
that a third party had access to his information because the violation
was merely putting additional digits of his credit card number on a
receipt; thus, his claim failed because his injury under FACTA did not
bear a “close relationship” to a common law action.226 In contrast, the
Eleventh Circuit has spelled out an argument that there is a sufficiently
“close relationship” between the injury meant to be prevented by
FACTA and a common law breach of confidence claim.227
These FACTA and FCRA claims, which involve intentional
disclosures in violation of statutes, are not data breach claims. But
courts’ analysis of what constitutes a statutory interest and what
constitutes a “close relationship” between a statutory interest and the
common law interest will have bearing on future data breach litigation
if Congress decides to create a private right of action in comprehensive
privacy legislation. Federal circuit courts will also impact future data
breach litigants if courts that are less receptive to arguments about
future harm face similar FCRA claims to the ones in In re Horizon.
statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate
that right.”).
221. 918 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2019).
222. Compare id., at 114 (noting that third party access is required to prove a close relationship
with privacy torts), with In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638–39 (“And with privacy torts, improper
dissemination of information can itself constitute a cognizable injury.”).
223. 918 F.3d at 102, 115 n.5, 116 (2019).
224. 846 F.3d at 638–39.
225. 918 F.3d at 114.
226. Id.
227. Note that the argument is merely illustrative because as of now, the court is waiting to
hear the case en banc and has vacated the previous rulings detailing this argument. See Muransky
v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 939 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019).
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Furthermore, the inconsistent outcomes arising from varied readings of
a given statutory interest demonstrate the importance of clearly
defining the statutory interest that the private right of action is meant
to protect.
States offer helpful examples on how to formulate a federal data
breach statute that may be able to confer standing, even for plaintiffs
seeking standing based on a violation of data breach notification
statutes. Data breach notification violations sound in procedure more
than other standing arguments based on an increased risk of harm or
broad violation of the right to privacy.228 Therefore, Spokeo’s
admonishment that “bare procedural violations” do not suffice to create
standing makes it particularly hard for plaintiffs to establish standing
to enforce data breach notification statutes.
Many states that include private rights of action in their data
breach laws require a demonstration of “actual damages” in order to
enforce statutory violations through a private right of action. As
documented in Section II.A, many data breach victims cannot yet
demonstrate “actual damages,” forcing them to argue that there is a
substantial risk of future harm. Requiring “actual damages” makes it
nearly impossible to privately enforce data breach notification, which
will only become more important as more and more consumers are
affected by data breaches.229
One scholar has documented the emphasis that state
legislatures put on notification statutes and argues that refusing to
honor a private right of action in a notification statute by denying
standing defeats the legislative intent of those statutes. 230 Her
argument’s existence is telling: the private rights of action and the
statutory text in many state statutes may not sufficiently convey the
legislative intent of their authors. Even California’s new privacy law,
the California Consumer Protection Act, may not go far enough to
incentivize notification because it allows for public enforcement only by
the attorney general.231
228. See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (conferring
standing based on the increased risk of harm, which also satisfied to create an additional concrete
interest to confer standing based on a statutory interest, but still denying standing based on a
failure to show a cognizable injury arising from a possible statutory violation of the data breach
notification provision).
229. See Press Release, Sen. Bob Menendez, What You Should Know About Equifax Data
Breach (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/what-youshould-know-about-equifax-data-breach [https://perma.cc/RR4R-6U4R] (noting that it was
“outrageous” for Equifax to wait more than a month to inform consumers of a breach).
230. See Elliott, supra note 72, at 242–47.
231. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150-155 (West 2020) (allowing individuals to get statutory
damages, but reserving enforcement of other violations of the Act, including the unreasonable
delay provisions, for the Attorney General).
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III. SOLUTIONS
This Note proposes two approaches that would independently
eliminate much of the uncertainty for data breach plaintiffs and
defendants. First, the Supreme Court should adopt a multifactor test
for assessing whether the risk of misuse—through either identity theft
or payment card fraud—is substantial after a breach. Second, Congress
should solve the standing issue by including in federal legislation that
victims have a “legally cognizable interest” that they can defend
through a statutory private right of action.
A. The Supreme Court Steps In
The Supreme Court should help clarify the divergent results by
establishing a test focused on intentionality, the nature of the
compromised data, and whether any of the victims of the breach have
had their data misused. As mentioned in Part II, the divergent results
and the various splits are heavily fact-dependent, which can make
standing in data breach cases difficult to analyze, but the injury-in-fact
inquiry inevitably requires heavy analysis of case facts. It is also
difficult to imagine one case that would allow the Supreme Court to
create a universal test resolving all uncertainty in the sphere of data
breach litigation. But if such a case were to arise, this Note proposes a
three-factor test that would help the Court and litigants wade through
the facts to reach common ground on standing.
The first factor, intentionality or targeting, would examine the
level of sophistication of the breach, as well as other evidence
demonstrating an intent to take the plaintiff’s information. Under the
current circuit analysis, opinions on both sides of the divergent results
can be reconciled with this approach. The Fourth Circuit properly
denied standing in Beck when a laptop was stolen because there was a
lack of intent to commit identity theft,232 while the D.C. Circuit properly
conferred standing when there was evidence that the Chinese
government—a sophisticated and potentially malicious party—was
responsible for a hack in In re OPM.233 The D.C. Circuit’s approach does
not expand standing to include all breaches that occur by hacking; if a
plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a hacker penetrated and copied
personal information, then she may not be able to show sufficient
intent.234 A test that grants standing at the moment of a breach—
232.
233.
234.
(finding

Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017).
In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
See Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 532–33 (D. Md. 2016)
that there was no standing when the data breach only gave hackers access to email
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independent of the information collected and the conduct involved—
would be in violation of Clapper’s instruction to examine “concrete
facts.”235 While the application of this factor may seemingly contravene
Clapper’s directive not to assess the decisionmaking of “independent
actors,” it does not because the test still relies on the
plaintiff(s) properly pleading her case with sufficient facts to
demonstrate intentionality.236
The second factor would focus on the nature of the information
disclosed, allowing courts to reject claims based on the sensitivity of the
stolen information. While credit cards may be less valuable to a data
thief than personally identifiable information and may only lead to
reimbursable fraudulent charges, the prospect of those charges should
be enough to confer standing.237 The main difference between credit
card data and other, more sensitive types of data is that the consumer
will have to take fewer steps to resolve the issue on the back end, but
the risk of injury is looking at the likelihood of injury, not the level of
damage to the consumer. Further, incurred mitigation costs could also
qualify as a concrete injury if they were incurred based on governmentand industry- recommended steps for victims to take in the wake of
a breach.238
By including encryption in the analysis, the test will also
incentivize companies to further encrypt their data, which will help
reduce data breaches and the likelihood of identity theft after any
breach.239 Encryption plays a role in both the intentionality factor and
the nature of the information factor because at least one court has
already used evidence of successful decryption of compromised
information to demonstrate the sophistication of the hacker, increasing

accounts, meaning that they did not target the personal information of patients when breaching
the hospital employees’ email accounts).
235. This is essentially what the Remijas logic, which assumes that the hacker wants to
commit identity theft, would necessitate. See John Biglow, It Stands to Reason: An Argument for
Article III Standing Based on the Threat of Future Harm in Data Breach Litigation, 17 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 943, 955–56 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt the Remijas logic
because malicious intent is enough to demonstrate a “substantial risk” of identity theft).
236. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013).
237. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2015)
(conferring standing when part of the class had experienced fraudulent charges after a hack).
238. See id. at 692. Note that this is not an argument that the underlying harm is substantial
because the government and industry recommend steps. This is an argument that the government
and industry should not be able to foist the cost of mitigation on consumers after a breach.
239. See Rick Robinson, The Impact of a Data Breach Can Be Minimized Through Encryption,
SEC. INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 21, 2014), https://securityintelligence.com/the-impact-of-a-data-breachcan-be-minimized-through-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/R9BK-555J] (noting that encryption with
a properly separated encryption key can reduce the value of data, disincentivizing any
actual theft).
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the likelihood of eventual identity theft.240 Prioritizing the
incorporation of encryption into analysis also represents low-hanging
fruit given the relatively low rate of encryption across industries. 241
Finally, if there is evidence of misuse or attempted misuse of any
of the compromised data, it should further contribute to the
substantiality of the risk of identity theft.242 Opponents of conferring
standing on data breach litigants who have not yet suffered identity
theft often point to the numbers on the percentage of data breaches that
result in identity theft.243 But where part of the class can already
demonstrate that malicious actors have used or tried to use part of the
compromised data, there is a logical inference that the risk of identity
theft increased for a given victim of that breach. This final factor should
be evaluated only with the other two. By drawing out these three
factors, it is clear there is less conflict among the circuits than some
have suggested.244
B. A Federal Private Right of Action in Privacy Legislation
As a second, independent legislative proposal, Congress should
step in and remove uncertainty for data breach plaintiffs. This
legislative proposal takes a page from California’s Consumer Privacy
Act, which became effective at the start of this year.245 A federal statute
seeking to have data breach victims at least get past the standing stage
must be properly constructed so that a data breach—even if
240. See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214–15 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(holding that the hackers’ deliberate targeting of the servers and their ability to use the
defendant’s own decryption software contributed to make the danger of misuse
“certainly impending”).
241. See 2019 THALES DATA THREAT REPORT GLOBAL EDITION, THALES 20 (2019),
https://www.thalesesecurity.com/2019/data-threat-report
[https://perma.cc/9LRP-BKT4]
(surveying 1,200 executives that handle IT and data security across the globe and finding that
“[f]ewer than 30% of enterprises say they use encryption for the vast majority of use cases studied,
including disk encryption within datacenters, from cloud providers, in big data environments, in
databases, within mobile devices, and in IoT environments”).
242. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027–28
(9th Cir. 2018) (finding that evidence that hackers took over plaintiffs’ email accounts supported
plaintiffs’ “contention that the hackers accessed information that could be used to help commit
identity fraud or identity theft”).
243. See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 768–71
(8th Cir. 2017) (relying on the 2007 GAO Report that found that only four out of twenty-four data
breaches from 2000 to 2005 had resulted in identity theft).
244. See George Lynch & Adam Cooke, Considering Standing Law and Future Risk of Harm
in
Data Breach
Litigation,
BLOOMBERG LAW
(Feb.
23,
2018,
12:37
PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/considering-standing-law-and-future-riskof-harm-in-data-breach-litigation [https://perma.cc/CF3A-6KYA] (arguing that the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits positions are particularly irreconcilable with those that deny standing).
245. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (West 2020).
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inadvertent—implicates an invasion of privacy based on a “close
relationship” to a traditionally recognized harm.246 Such harms that
have “traditionally been regarded as providing a basis”247 for a common
law action include a range of privacy torts, such as the unreasonable
intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of another’s name or likeness,
unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life, and publicity that
unreasonably places another in a false light.248 Because merely a “close
relationship” is required, a perfect analog is likely not necessary; the
underlying concern of common law privacy torts—the inability of an
individual to control her personal information 249—would likely suffice
to create “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete
and particularized and actual or imminent.”250
Borrowing from both the In re Horizon court’s finding that the
FCRA’s private right of action was meant to allow plaintiffs to protect
against “unauthorized dissemination of personal information by a
credit reporting agency”251 and California’s private right of action,252 a
narrow federal statute could define the scope of the private right of
action by writing that it is meant to “protect against the unauthorized

246. See Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“[I]t is instructive to consider whether an
alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as
providing a basis for a lawsuit.”).
247. Id.
248. Long v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 324 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2)(a)-(d) (1977)); see DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 1:1 (2016)
(“[T]he privacy torts have become well-ensconced in the fabric of American law.” (footnotes
omitted)). Note that breach of confidence is another possible common law action that may have a
close relationship with the unauthorized disclosure of information. See Alicia Solow-Niederman,
Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE
L.J.F. 614, 619–24 (2018) (arguing that the mere disclosure of another’s information given in
confidence, not the misuse or publication of that information, sufficed to create a harm at common
law). But see Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114–15 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that breach
of confidence required the party violating confidence to have shown the information to a third
party, a fact that is not always readily available to data breach victims).
249. Long, 903 F.3d at 324.
250. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see In re Horizon Healthcare Servs.
Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639–40 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that it is not necessary for a given
claim to be an exact match for a common law cause of action, as long as the interest that Congress
wanted to statutorily protect is the same injury as the one protected by the common law action).
251. 846 F.3d at 639.
252. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (West 2020):
Any consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information . . . is subject
to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the
business’s violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the
personal information may institute a civil action . . . .
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access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure of a consumer’s
nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information.”253
This proposed language is versatile enough to fit in a gambit of
consumer protection statutes, so even if a comprehensive data privacy
bill is unlikely, Congress could still continue expanding coverage
piecemeal by inserting this language in other bills covering consumers.
Assuming Congress adopted this language, however, the courts would
still have to make the connection between the common law privacy torts
and the interest created by Congress.
The Third Circuit’s analysis in In re Horizon provides an
illustration of how a court would analyze such a private right of action
in federal legislation,254 and the circuit’s interpretations of FACTA’s
private right of action serve as a cautionary tale for drafters. To ensure
the private right of action’s proper breadth, it is important for drafters
to clearly link the interest that the private right of action is meant to
vindicate with the interest protected by a traditionally recognized
common law cause of action.255 The Third Circuit’s analysis in Kamal
shows the importance of explicitly spelling out the acceptable chain of
inferences necessary to create a concrete injury. There, the plaintiff
argued that the defendant had violated FACTA by including more digits
of a credit card on a receipt than the statute allowed. 256 The defendant
had plainly violated that statutory requirement, but the Kamal court
refused to grant standing partially because the plaintiff’s injury was not

253. Notably, the proposed language does not include any restrictions on what kind of data
breaches may lead to a viable action because the focus of this Note is to provide possible solutions
to the standing hurdle and does not address what statutory language would be necessary to ensure
that victims are fairly compensated. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634, 637–39
(7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff had standing to sue based on identity theft as a future
harm but that the increased risk of identity theft was not “compensable”). Statutory damages may
be one way to ensure compensation; as of January 1, 2020, California became the first state to
allow consumers whose information has been compromised to recover statutory damages to
compensate for a breach, even in the absence of actual damages. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150
(West 2020).
254. See 846 F.3d at 638–39 (walking through how a breach creates an invasion of privacy
similar to the tort of unreasonable publicity).
255. Compare Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114–15 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that
even under FACTA, which includes a private right of action, the common law action of breach of
confidence required disclosure to a third party and that absent facts demonstrating such a
disclosure, there was no intangible injury sufficient to survive Spokeo), with Muransky v. Godiva
Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2019) (taking issue with how “close” the Third
Circuit asserted that the common law action had to be to the present action and holding that a
common law breach of confidence action protected against the same injury that Congress was
trying to prevent with FACTA).
256. Kamal, 918 F.3d at 106.
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sufficiently “close” to any common law privacy torts. 257 The court
determined the traditional privacy torts were rooted in a third party
gaining access to a plaintiff’s personal information, and unlike in In re
Horizon, there was no allegation that anyone else had seen the
plaintiff’s information.258 If other courts follow the Third Circuit’s lead,
then plaintiffs who allege a breach—but cannot demonstrate that their
specific information was accessed259—may be unable to vindicate a
given private right of action if Congress does not clearly state the
interest that the statute is meant to protect and how that interest links
to the common law. These two Third Circuit cases show the importance
of properly wording a statute by directly linking the concrete interest a
data breach statute seeks to protect—whether that is the right to
information or the right to privacy260—with the private right of
action itself.
While few states create a private right that would explicitly
allow a plaintiff to sue in the absence of actual damages, California’s
CCPA serves as an example of how a legislature could do so.261
Congressional drafters would be wise to learn from state statutes that
are less than explicit in whether they allow private enforcement. For
instance, Iowa’s data breach notification statute is geared towards
enforcement by the Iowa Attorney General,262 but it also states “[t]he
rights and remedies available under this section are cumulative to each
other and to any other rights and remedies available under the law.”263
This ambiguity about private enforcement is not unique to Iowa.264 And
this again places courts in a position of determining whether a private

257. Id. at 114–15. The court also refused to grant standing because it determined that FACTA
was meant to protect against actual identity theft rather than just the risk of identity theft. Id. at
115–16.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying standing
plaintiff alleged only that the defendant’s system, which contained personal and financial
information on employees, had been accessed, not that the information had been “read, copied,
and understood”).
260. See Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 499–500 (9th Cir. 2017) (conferring standing based
on a right to information and a right to privacy rooted in the FCRA).
261. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (West 2020); see also, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3075 (2019)
(allowing for a civil action to recover “actual damages” resulting from a failure to disclose a breach
in a “timely manner”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2013) (allowing residents to sue to recover “actual
damages” resulting from a negligent violation of the statute).
262. See IOWA CODE § 715C.2 (2018) (prescribing that “the attorney general may seek and
obtain an order that a party held to violate th[e] section pay damages to the attorney general on
behalf of a person injured by the violation”).
263. Id. § 715C.2(9)(b).
264. See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1169 (D. Minn.
2014) (classifying Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, and Wyoming data breach
statutes as ambiguous as to private enforcement mechanisms).
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right of action exists, while plaintiffs are faced with additional
uncertainty as to whether their claim will even get past a motion to
dismiss.265 This burden on courts can be significant, especially if
plaintiffs follow the example of recent litigants’ cases after large
breaches and allege a violation of over thirty states’ statutes at a
time.266 Therefore, though it is less than ideal because it continues to
contribute to the patchwork of data breach notification, states like Iowa
could also adopt this Note’s proposed language and create more explicit
private rights of action as a way of providing clarity to courts
and litigants.
Notably, even California’s CCPA may come up short in
incentivizing effective notification because it relies on limited public
resources rather than private enforcement. Attorneys General have a
range of mandates, but private parties are properly incentivized to
ensure that companies adequately notify consumers. Moreover,
granting the FTC additional authority to oversee broad enforcement of
a data breach notification may not even suffice given the FTC’s myriad
mandates and resource constraints.267 Any federal statute should not
only follow California in allowing for a private right of action, but must
also clarify that injuries that may seem procedural are clearly linked to
a specific concrete interest in order to provide clarity to courts and to
ensure victims can help enforce statutory violations.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of a federal statute and Supreme Court action,
federal privacy law stagnates, detrimentally affecting consumers on
a variety of levels.268 This Note proposes a test that would provide
guidance to the circuit courts on how to properly analyze standing in
data breach litigation and also to the U.S. legal community on how the

265. Compare In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1295
(N.D. Ga. 2019) (allowing a private claim under the Wisconsin data breach notification statute to
survive motion to dismiss when the court used statutory interpretation to conclude that the
Wisconsin data breach statute was silent as to whether a private right of action exists), with Fox
v. Iowa Health Sys., 399 F. Supp. 3d 780, 800 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (granting a motion to dismiss after
finding that the Wisconsin data breach statute did not create a private right of action).
266. See In re Target, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1158 (alleging a violation of thirty-eight states’ data
breach notification statutes).
267. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Woody Hartzog & Daniel Solove, The FTC Can Rise to the
Privacy Challenge, but Not Without Help from Congress, BROOKINGS (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/08/08/the-ftc-can-rise-to-the-privacy-challengebut-not-without-help-from-congress/ [https://perma.cc/LY62-XD2D] (noting that increased funding
for the FTC is essential even absent any expansion in its statutory authority).
268. See Richards, supra note 19, at 1464 (noting the federal government’s lag in confronting
the changes that technology and big data have imposed on society).
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Court will assess future injuries in general. The test focuses on the facts
underlying a data breach. As an added institutional competence benefit,
grappling with those facts would also help update the Court’s privacy
knowledge—and as a result, its jurisprudence. In a world of judicial
inaction, Congress can also take steps to provide data breach victims
with firmer ground to stand on by creating a concrete interest in a
federal data breach statute that includes a private right of action. The
statute should make clear that consumers have a right to know about
any breach in a reasonable amount of time and that the private right of
action is meant to protect that right. If the statute is unclear about what
right it is meant to protect, Congress’s desired outcome will be left up
to judicial interpretation about what common law right a given statute
is meant to protect—possibly leading to further complications at the
standing stage.
Return to the woman who bought groceries with her credit card.
As it stands, she faces extreme uncertainty in the wake of the breach,269
and she can expect little help from the federal government. She must
first assess what circuit she should file in, then she has to determine
whether she falls within a state’s private right of action or within one
of the few federal statutes that contain a private right of action—and
this is just the legal uncertainty. Though some companies offer credit
monitoring services for a given period of time after a breach, plaintiffs
typically pay—with their time or with their money—for any costs
associated with changing their information, which amounts to an added
cost of uncertainty. This Note confronts the uncertainty these data
breach litigants face, and by taking up either of the proposed solutions,
the federal government can provide much needed clarity and remove
some of that uncertainty.
Devin Urness*

269. Solove & Citron, supra note 13, at 750–54 (discussing the harms that come from that
uncertainty, including the increased-risk-of harm, costs associated with preventing harm,
and anxiety).
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